We may believe that affirmative action programs are morally wrong, or that they are morally required, or that they are neither wrong nor required.
We may believe that affirmative action programs are morally wrong, or that they are morally required, or that they are neither wrong nor required.If they are neither required nor morally wrong, which is what many educators think, then a university is morally free to make a judgment one way or the other on non-moral grounds: to serve optional educational goals, for example.Because the first two principal sections of this paper (especially the first principal section) may appear somewhat disconnected from the remaining portions, I should here briefly clarify how the paper hangs together.
Although this paper will seek to explain why Smith’s retorts to those critiques are unsuccessful, it will also criticize Dworkin in some respects.
In the argumentative dialectic between moral realists and non-cognitivist moral antirealists each side in the debate is typically thought to enjoy a different prima facie advantage over its rival.
Moral realism gains plausibility from its truth-conditional semantics because it can explain the meaning of moral judgments on the same basis as ordinary propositions.
of the paper, which will maintain that expressivism construed as a philosophical account of the pragmatics of moral discourse is fully consistent with both the Reconception of Meta-Ethics Proposition and the Objectivity Proposition.
Expressivism so construed is therefore fully consistent with moral realism as a moral doctrine. will further elucidate moral realism as a moral doctrine by highlighting the centrality of a minimalist conception of truth within it and by emphasizing that it calls for a reconception—rather than a repudiation—of meta-ethics. : 32–37, 40–51) Still, because this section of my paper will be focusing principally on Smith’s rejoinder to Dworkin, and because in any event Dworkin did not alter the gist of his critique of the error theory, I will quote here the passage by Dworkin that appears in Smith’s article: There are three available positions about most questions of moral right and wrong.