(For this reason Schelling in our day, as the originator of the system of identity, has again relished it*} However, it did not please the famous philosophiz¬ ing mathematician, polyhistor, and politician to employ them for this purpose, but to this end he expressly formulated the pre-established harmony* This now furnishes us with two entirely different worlds, each incapable of acting in any way on the other ( Principle philos^ § 84, and Examen du sentiment du F.
Maiebrancke, pp, 500 ffi of the Oeuvres de Leibni Zi publ* SKETCH OF A HISTORY OF IDEAL AND REAL 7 by Raspe), each the wholly superfluous duplicate of the other* But yet the two are now supposed to exist once for all, to run exactly parallel to each other, and to keep time with each other to a hair* Therefore at the very beginning, the originator of both established between them the precisest harmony wherein they now continue most beautifully to run side by side.
Here too Malebranche goes a step farther and teaches that we see all things immediately in God himself.
This certainly is equivalent to explaining something unknown by something even more unknown.
For this difficulty is merely a consequence of rational psychology and, therefore, needs only to be discarded as a fiction, as is done by Spinoza, Moreover, there is, as the argumentum ad h&minem 9 against the upholders of rational psychology, their dogma that God, who is indeed a spirit, created the corporeal world and continues to govern it' and so a spirit can act immediately on bodies.
On the contrary, the difficulty is and remains merely the Cartesian, namely that the world, which alone is given immediately to us, is only ideal, in other words, one that consists of mere representations in our head; whereas, over and above this, we undertake to judge of a real world, in other words, one that exists independently of our representa¬ tions.7 : Onto it cormexio idearum idem est, ac ordo it ewmexio return*— Pt. 1 : Front cogitationcs urumqut idem coneatenantur in Afente, ita corporis affeeti quam rerum singular* iwn idsae non ipsa ideata* situs res perceptes pro causa ejficieflte agnoscunt: sed ip sum Deum , quatenus est res cogikms, [‘The order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things. 1 ] 5 [‘Physical influence 1 , (Term used by Descartes.)] 8 SKETCH OF A HISTORY OF IDEAL AND REAL thing altogether, for here he had already given up the mere fact, constituting the problem, namely that the world is immediately given to us merely as our representation, in order to substitute for it the dogma of a corporeal world and a spiritual world between which no bridge is possible* For he interweaves the question concerning the relation of representa¬ tions to things-in-themselves with that concerning the possibility of the movements of the body through the will, and now solves both together by means of his harmonia praestabilita.(See Systime nouveau de la nature , in Leibniz's Works , ed, Erdmann, p, 125—Brucker, Hist * PA., Tom. n, p, 425.) The monstrous absurdity of his assumption was placed in the clearest light even by some of his contemporaries, especially by Bayle, who showed the consequences resulting from it* (See also in Leibniz's short works, translated by Huth, 1740, the note on page 79, where Leibniz himself is compelled to expose the revolting consequences of his contention.) Nevertheless, the very absurdity of the assumption, to which a thinking mind was driven by the problem before us, shows its magnitude, difficulty, and perplexity, and also how little we are able to brush it aside and thus cut the knot by merely repudiating it, as some in our day have ventured to do.In the seventeenth century, on the contrary, philosophy again forsook that path and accordingly arrived at Locke, on the one hand, for whom Bacon and Hobbes had paved the way, and at Christian Wolff, on the other, through Leibniz* These two were then dominant in the eighteenth century, especially in Germany, although ultimately only in so far as they had been initiated into syncretistic eclecticism.Malebranche’s profound ideas, however, first gave rise to Leibniz’s system of harmonia praestabilita^ and the widespread fame and high repute of this in his day furnish a proof of the fact that in the world the absurd most easily succeeds* Although I cannot boast of having a clear notion of Leibniz's monads, which are at the same time mathematical points, material atoms, and souls, yet it seems to me beyond doubt that such an assumption once settled could help to save us from all further hypotheses for explaining the connection between the ideal and the real, and to dispose of the question by the fact that both are already fully identified in the monads.OXFORD volume I Tim lithe only complete English translation ul cin-c L^r the most significant and fascinarmgmrks of the great philosopher Ar thur Sehupenhauct:178a—ifl6o). which Schopenhauer believed he had solved m lus own philosophy and range over imm 1 popular lopics such a? T of spirit “H-ving and the perennial theme ol worldly wisdom. ,md rich divet Mty of these esjtyj are ^lill v Lnkaxit; today. belt known today (or Jta ’tl.i LLu Will aid Rep Hyn Uilmi published in 13 up however 11 Was onlv liter the publication nf Pttmgt ani fbra JVpotru Ti.i 111 I kit his ci Hier writings received Knotts a Etencton and won incenu Ejunil fame ft# him, ( he tis long cssjvs m Fhe iim volume rhe J^JTi^ir i begin wirh a his Torical account oi the problem ol trial mg the ideal eh the real.Incidentally, the karmonia praestabil Ua might perhaps be best rendered comprehensible by a comparison with the stage.Here very often the influxus pkysicus 5 only apparently exists, since cause and effect are connected merely by means of a pre-established harmony of the stage manager, for example, when the one shoots and the other falls a tempo . The formal existence of ideas has God as its cause, in so fax as he is considered as a thinking being, and not in so far as he is evolved by another attribute.The difficulty is not the one into which Leibniz would prefer to distort it (e,g* Tkiodicie , Pt.i, § 59), namely that between the assumed souls or minds and the corporeal world, as between two wholly heterogeneous kinds of substances, absolutely no action and connection can take place, for which reason he denied physical influence.